The Social Importance of Tolerance May 16, 2009
Posted by David in Economics, Politics, The Social Sciences.Tags: Gay Index, Inglehart, Postmaterialism, Richard Florida, Tolerance Index, World Values Survey
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Inglehart likes to argue that postmaterialist values are strongly associated with democracy (see my preceding blog entry). Inglehart further contends that postmaterialists – according to his four-item, eight-item, or twelve-item indices – will be increasing as a proportion of the population as long as there is sustained economic growth and peaceful external relations. This should reflect a stable cohort effect where values are established during childhood socialization processes.
While I agree with the thrust of Inglehart’s arguments and hypotheses, I think that the latest wave of the world values survey demonstrates that other measures are better at identifying cohort effects than any index of postmaterialism. For example, the percentage of American WVS respondents who identified strong defense forces as their top priority – one of the key materialism indicators – was 15.5% in 1990, 14.3% in 1995, 16.0% in 1999, but 29.0% in 2006. Meanwhile, “protecting freedom of speech” – a key postmaterialism indicator – was 22.6% in 1990, 21.2% in 1995, 25.4% in 1999, but then went down to 17.8% in 2006. This is not what we would expect from a stable cohort effect — instead I suspect that the perceived insecurity of adulthood rather than childhood explains the greater proportion of materialists in the United States in 2006 than during the 1990s.
However, Inglehart’s charts indicate that intolerance is as strongly associated with modernism as postmaterialism is with postmodernism. But tolerance seems less susceptible to external shocks such as terrorist attacks or preparations for war. For example, the percentage of Americans that would not like neighbors of another race than their own was 8.7% in 1990, 6.6% in 1995, 8.0% in 1999 and 4.1% in 2006. A similar downward trend is for the most part evident for the percentage wishing to avoid gay neighbors: 38.6% in 1990, 29.5% in 1995, 23.3% in 1999 and 26.0% in 2006. And I think the greater stability of the tolerance measures makes a lot of intuitive sense: why would an economic recession or a war make me less willing to have gay neighbors, assuming that I grew up in a non-homophobic environment? On the other hand, it is plausible that a recession would focus my attention on the prospects for economic growth and that a war would make me worry about the nation’s defense capabilities (admittedly the second scenario is not plausible in my case; I have always been an admirer of the defense policies of Costa Rica, the Norwegian territory of Svalbard and the autonomous Finnish island of Åland).
To back up my hypothesis, I have spent the last week estimating associations between tolerance and various measures of institutional performance that I believe are relevant for anyone with broadly democratic values: freedom of the press (Freedom House), political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House), corruption (Transparency International) and the Democracy Index of the Economist magazine. I also looked at a performance measure that appeals beyond committed liberals or democrats: the Human Development Index of the United Nations, which reflects per capita GDP, life expectancy, and literacy; to complete the picture I then looked at a favored measure among classical liberals: the Economic Freedom Index of the Fraser Institute. Finally, I combined all these indices into an aggregate index that should reflect combined performance in terms of civil liberties, democracy, rule of law, economic freedom, and material standard of living (I call it the Socio-economic Development Index, or SDI).
There is a very predictable pattern that is revealed when perusing all these indices: the best-performing ten countries are almost always the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, closely followed by countries such as the US, the UK, Germany, Belgium, France, and Spain. The exception is the economic freedom index, where the top 10 consist of English-speaking countries, Switzerland, and two well-known Asian city states, closely followed by the Nordic countries with the notable exception of Sweden.
Anyway, the correlations between a special Tolerance Index (acceptance of other-race, immigrant, and gay neighbors and general acceptance of homosexuality, divorce, and prostitution) and the various performance measures turned out as follows, including all 83 countries that took part in the WVS at least once between 1995 and 2008 with the relevant questions included:
Socio-economic Development Index: .807
The Economist’s Democracy Index: .791
Corruption Perceptions Index: .727
Freedom of the Press Index: .704
Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index: .704
Human Development Index: .667
Economic Freedom Index: .564
Partial correlation analysis revealed that the effect of the Tolerance Index remained highly statistically significant after controlling for Inglehart’s Postmaterialist Liberty Aspirations Index (e.g. .596 as the partial Tolerance Index -SDI correlation), while the reverse was not true (only .165 between Inglehart’s index and the SDI when controlling for the Tolerance Index, which is insignificant at the one-tailed .05 level). The Tolerance Index also remains significant after controlling for per capita GDP (e.g. .486 between the Tolerance Index and the Democracy Index when controlling for per capita GDP in purchasing power parity dollars).
Another interesting result is that the two measures of tolerance toward gays were almost as strongly correlated with the various freedom and democracy measures as the Tolerance Index itself. For example, the simple correlation between acceptance of gay neighbors and the aggregate SDI index is .762, which is a remarkably close association.
Inglehart emphasizes that the evolution of values, economies, and political systems are interdependent, and that consequently there is neither a Weberian priority given to values as ultimate deteminants, nor a Marxian priority of economic relationships. I agree. But what I think this simple analysis shows is that tolerance is closely associated with freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and economic well-being. This is not a new insight, but I think that the relationship is much stronger than most people (including me) would have dared hope for.
I have to admit that I am not a value-neutral analyst in this case. I actually think that tolerance is the greatest of the social virtues. And it’s great to have a good evidential argument against social conservatives: whether your priority is freedom of speech, democracy, free markets, the rule of law, or economic development it follows that social tolerance is your friend, not your enemy. And the tolerance that matters most is sexual tolerance, closely followed by multicultural and racial tolerance. In other words, intolerant goals can probably only be attained at the cost of living in a less free, less democratic, more corrupt, more regulated, and less prosperous society.
This conclusion actually echoes Richard Florida’s arguments, whose main point has been that economically dynamic and culturally creative regions require tolerant values, as well as talented individuals and high technology. Florida is of course also famous for his “gay index,” which measures regional concentrations of gay residents rather than national attitutes toward gays or homosexuality. While I was originally a little skeptical (I thought that the notion of a “gay index” is more likely to be noticed than other indices, and is therefore an attractive self-promotion strategy), I now think that Florida is really onto something with his “3T” message. And this is all to the best.
Meanwhile, these indices and results can be used to offer location advice in a globalized world:
For tolerant free-market types: Switzerland
For tolerant welfare-state types: Sweden
For intolerant free-market types: Singapore
For intolerant welfare-state types: France (ok, intolerant by OECD standards only, not by global standards)
For homophobes: Jordan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh should all be ideal, although Iran is a close runner-up.
For tolerant people who don’t like snow: Spain
In case you are wondering, the top ten countries according to the tolerance index are Andorra, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Iceland, Denmark, Australia, Germany, and New Zealand. The bottom ten (of 83 surveyed nations) are – beginning at the bottom of the list – Bangladesh, Jordan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Georgia, Rwanda, Nigeria, and Morocco.
Postmaterialist Liberty Aspirations May 1, 2009
Posted by David in Life in Taiwan, Politics, The Social Sciences.Tags: Christian Welzel, Inglehart, World Values Survey
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I’m spending a lot of time reading articles related to the World Values Survey, Postmaterialism and “Postmodernization” processes at present. The reason for this is that these studies are directly related to my ongoing project on emerging values in the Oresund region. Today I read an unusually interesting article by Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart, entitled “Liberalism, Postmaterialism, and the Growth of Freedom” (International Review of Sociology, 15: 81-108, 2005). In that article, they use a subset of the 12-item Postmaterialism Index that only includes those postmaterialist options that signal a prioritization of liberal democracy over other social objectives. The priorities in question are “freedom of speech,” “giving people more say in important government decisions,” and “giving people more say at their jobs and in their communities.” Using regression analyses, Welzel and Inglehart show that this index is the best possible predictor of the direction of change over time in the index of civil and political liberties as measured by Freedom House, after controlling for per capita GDP (a significant variable) and a host of other variables that turned out to be insignificant when combined with the liberty aspiration index (i.e. income inequality, ethnic diversity, religious diversity, tolerance of out-groups, share of Protestants, and the level of political and civil liberties 10 years prior to the study period).
Interestingly, Taiwan is identified as an outlier. According to the results of both the 1994 and 2006 surveys, Taiwan’s population has the second-lowest (!) liberty aspirations in the world, after Pakistan. And I can personally attest from informal surveys of Taiwanese students that very few of them select “freedom of speech” as a priority, and many of them even indicate that there is too much freedom of speech in Taiwan. This is something that I find difficult to understand, given my values. Indeed, Taiwan has greater freedom of speech than almost any other Asian country, and is perhaps the main reason why I am prepared to live here. And though I like to complain about the two main Taiwanese parties (the KMT and the DPP), I have to grant them a greater concern with maintaining freedom of speech than is typical of the general population. I would guess that the Taiwanese anomaly is the result of two reinforcing factors: the need for American moral support and the fact that a majority of government ministers – in both KMT and DPP governments – were educated at American universities.
The other interesting observation is that the liberty aspiration of the American population declined substantially between 1999 and 2006. The only fully developed Western democracy that had lower liberty aspirations (in 1999) than the United States (in 2006) was Israel. In both cases, “strong defense forces” were prioritized over “giving people more say at work and in their communities.” War, in other words, seems especially destructive of the values that are the foundation for sustainable liberal democracy. In the American case, I also think that the Patriot Act and other assaults on the freedom of expression caused many of the less-informed citizens to waver in their support for free speech. In my view, the combined effects of an open-ended and ill-defined War on Terror and ever greater powers for the federal government to snoop on private written and spoken communications were the worst consequences of the Bush presidency, and the real reason why he was the worst president in American history. The economic mismanagement of the Bush administration was regrettable, but very similar to the ill-conceived plans of countless other governments, whether Democrat, Republican or European.
Anyway, here is a table with “liberty aspirations” around the world. The index ranges from 0 (no-one has any postmaterialist liberty aspirations) to 5 (everyone selects the options in a way that gives priority to liberty aspirations to the maximum extent possible). Highly developed and durable liberal democracies are in bold style:
Postmaterialist liberty aspirations index, 1999-2006
| Country | Index | ||
| Andorra |
3.047 |
Cyprus |
1.628 |
| Canada |
2.939 |
Malaysia |
1.627 |
| Britain |
2.889 |
Singapore |
1.614 |
| Netherlands |
2.795 |
Turkey |
1.611 |
| Switzerland |
2.795 |
Thailand |
1.592 |
| Sweden |
2.760 |
Moldova |
1.580 |
| Finland |
2.726 |
Kyrgyzstan |
1.577 |
| Puerto Rico |
2.656 |
Uganda |
1.562 |
| USA 1999 |
2.623 |
Algeria |
1.551 |
| Germany |
2.591 |
Ghana |
1.540 |
| Slovenia |
2.584 |
Bangladesh |
1.524 |
| Italy |
2.512 |
Ukraine |
1.490 |
| New Zealand |
2.505 |
Serbia |
1.482 |
| Mexico |
2.500 |
Vietnam |
1.473 |
| Australia |
2.490 |
Bosnia |
1.430 |
| Dominican Republic |
2.441 |
Burkina Faso |
1.420 |
| France |
2.386 |
South Korea |
1.395 |
| Peru |
2.350 |
India |
1.377 |
| Chile |
2.211 |
Mali |
1.321 |
| Spain |
2.187 |
Romania |
1.252 |
| Poland |
2.170 |
Morocco |
1.250 |
| Japan |
2.129 |
Bulgaria |
1.242 |
| Venezuela |
2.127 |
Macedonia |
1.233 |
| Argentina |
2.077 |
Indonesia |
1.209 |
| Brazil |
2.073 |
Tanzania |
1.186 |
| USA 2006 |
2.022 |
Armenia |
1.172 |
| Trinidad |
1.940 |
Georgia |
1.169 |
| Ethiopia |
1.911 |
Russia |
1.152 |
| Rwanda |
1.906 |
Egypt |
1.128 |
| South Africa |
1.876 |
Jordan |
1.078 |
| Zambia |
1.829 |
China |
1.074 |
| Israel |
1.819 |
Albania |
1.018 |
| Philippines |
1.754 |
Taiwan |
.855 |
| Nigeria |
1.707 |
Pakistan |
.807 |
| Iran |
1.649 |
|
Postmaterialism April 30, 2009
Posted by David in The Social Sciences.Tags: Inglehart, World Values Survey
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Ronald Inglehart is most famous for his “Postmaterialism index,” which attempts to measure the balance of postmaterialist and materialist values in a society. According to his theory, people who take their physical and material security for granted are more likely to give priority to other issues than establishing and maintaining such security. His original index is quite simple; it consists of four items of which interviewees have to choose two as being their first and second priorities. Inglehart later expanded his index to encompass three questions and twelve items. His original four-item index provides the following options:
4-item postmaterialism index
|
Priority |
Materialism |
Post- materialism |
|
Maintaining order in the nation |
X |
|
|
Giving people more say in important government decisions |
|
X |
|
Fighting rising prices |
X |
|
|
Protecting freedom of speech |
|
X |
Here are some index result, where the index equals (percentage with two postmaterialist priorities) – (percentage with two materialist priorities):
Four-item postmaterialism index
|
Country |
Index, 1981 |
Index, 1990 |
Index, 1995 |
Index, 2000 |
Index, 2006 |
|
Canada |
-6.3 |
13.7 |
|
20.8 |
20.9 |
|
Sweden |
-11.3 |
8.6 |
11.2 |
16.1 |
19.3 |
|
Great Britain |
-12.0 |
-.3 |
6.7 |
|
13.9 |
|
Switzerland |
|
10.8 |
3.9 |
|
8.7 |
|
Italy |
-39.0 |
-2.1 |
|
14.3 |
1.2 |
|
Netherlands |
-5.4 |
22.1 |
|
10.2 |
-1.8 |
|
Germany |
|
|
|
-15.0 |
-3.6 |
|
United States |
|
6.1 |
13.0 |
16.1 |
-3.7 |
|
France |
-15.4 |
4.2 |
|
-10.0 |
-7.8 |
|
Japan |
-31.7 |
-18.6 |
-16.0 |
-8.2 |
-15.7 |
|
Argentina |
-18.8 |
-6.1 |
13.8 |
7.3 |
-18.0 |
|
Spain |
-41.0 |
-5.4 |
-11.3 |
-8.0 |
-24.0 |
|
China |
|
|
-69.2 |
|
-44.0 |
|
Taiwan |
|
|
-43.0 |
|
-51.6 |
|
South Korea |
-34.2 |
-34.4 |
-40.9 |
-40.8 |
-52.0 |
|
Russia |
|
-36.0 |
-53.9 |
-50.4 |
-53.4 |
Note the big decline in Postmaterialist priorities in the United States, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands between 2000 and 2006. Could this have something to do with 9/11 and the War on Terror?
Another Look at Neighborly Intolerance from Andorra to Jordan April 20, 2009
Posted by David in The Social Sciences.Tags: World Values Survey
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The table speaks for itself, but note that while the Americas are homophobic, there seems to be a lot of ignorance regarding HIV transmission in eastern Asia. Italy (Gypsies), Germany (Muslims), Iraq (Jews), and India (different religion) seem to be special cases. Jordan again ranks as the most intolerant society in the world, while residents of tiny Andorra seem most relaxed.
|
Country |
Least popular group |
Respondents who don’t want members of least popular group as neighbors (%) |
|
Jordan |
Homosexuals |
97.0 |
|
South Korea |
People who have AIDS |
93.6 |
|
Iran |
Homosexuals |
93.4 |
|
Georgia |
Homosexuals |
93.2 |
|
Iraq |
Jews |
92.6 |
|
Turkey |
Homosexuals |
89.4 |
|
Italy |
Gypsies |
86.3 |
|
Ethiopia |
Homosexuals |
83.4 |
|
Burkina Faso |
Homosexuals |
81.6 |
|
Ghana |
Homosexuals |
79.3 |
|
Morocco |
Unmarried couples living together |
78.5 |
|
China |
People who have AIDS |
76.6 |
|
Zambia |
Homosexuals |
74.9 |
|
Taiwan |
People who have AIDS |
73.7 |
|
Serbia |
Homosexuals |
73.2 |
|
Indonesia |
Unmarried couples living together |
71.6 |
|
Malaysia |
Homosexuals |
71.3 |
|
Moldova |
Homosexuals |
71.0 |
|
Trinidad |
Homosexuals |
68.0 |
|
Romania |
Homosexuals |
67.5 |
|
Russia |
Homosexuals |
67.5 |
|
Mali |
Homosexuals |
67.0 |
|
Rwanda |
Homosexuals |
63.3 |
|
Ukraine |
Homosexuals |
59.6 |
|
Thailand |
People who have AIDS |
58.4 |
|
Hong Kong |
Homosexuals |
58.3 |
|
Poland |
Homosexuals |
56.3 |
|
Vietnam |
People who have AIDS |
55.0 |
|
Bulgaria |
People who have AIDS |
54.1 |
|
Colombia |
Homosexuals |
53.5 |
|
Cyprus |
Homosexuals |
50.0 |
|
India |
People of a different religion |
49.2 |
|
Slovenia |
Gypsies |
46.8 |
|
South Africa |
Homosexuals |
45.9 |
|
Spain |
Gypsies |
45.6 |
|
Peru |
Homosexuals |
45.2 |
|
France |
Immigrants |
43.2 |
|
Chile |
Homosexuals |
39.1 |
|
Mexico |
Homosexuals |
33.0 |
|
Germany |
Muslims |
29.5 |
|
Brazil |
Homosexuals |
26.1 |
|
United States |
Homosexuals |
26.0 |
|
Finland |
Russians |
24.0 |
|
Argentina |
Homosexuals |
23.7 |
|
Australia |
Aborigines |
22.5 |
|
New Zealand |
People who have AIDS |
21.7 |
|
Great Britain |
Homosexuals |
18.8 |
|
Canada |
Homosexuals |
15.7 |
|
Switzerland |
Homosexuals |
12.4 |
|
Netherlands |
People who have AIDS |
11.0 |
|
Sweden |
Muslims |
10.0 |
|
Andorra |
People who have AIDS |
8.9 |
Note: I have excluded drug addicts and heavy drinkers, since these two groups are always very unpopular as neighbors.
Racism, Xenophobia, Linguistic Chauvinism, and Religious Intolerance Around the World April 20, 2009
Posted by David in The Social Sciences.Tags: World Values Survey
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One way of measuring intolerance is to ask people what kind of neighbors they would rather not have. The World Values Survey asks the following question: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” The table below gives estimates of relative intolerance in all countries that took part in the 2005-2007 wave of the World Values Survey. The samples are random samples of adults with between 760 (Andorra) and 1,988 (China) observations in each country.
Table: Intolerance measures, percentages
|
Country |
Other race |
Immigrants Guest workers |
Different language |
Different religion |
|
Jordan |
52 |
68 |
49 |
51 |
|
India |
49 |
39 |
45 |
49 |
|
Vietnam |
42 |
45 |
42 |
42 |
|
Rwanda |
37 |
36 |
40 |
36 |
|
South Korea |
36 |
38 |
32 |
26 |
|
Indonesia |
32 |
36 |
34 |
35 |
|
Iran |
32 |
60 |
NA |
38 |
|
Turkey |
30 |
31 |
26 |
34 |
|
Zambia |
30 |
28 |
24 |
27 |
|
Thailand |
28 |
44 |
20 |
28 |
|
France |
27 |
43 |
28 |
30 |
|
Georgia |
25 |
24 |
14 |
36 |
|
Moldova |
24 |
19 |
16 |
26 |
|
Morocco |
23 |
24 |
26 |
36 |
|
Ghana |
22 |
26 |
25 |
24 |
|
Mali |
22 |
25 |
20 |
24 |
|
Malaysia |
21 |
57 |
20 |
23 |
|
Bulgaria |
21 |
19 |
13 |
16 |
|
Romania |
20 |
19 |
13 |
17 |
|
Serbia |
19 |
26 |
10 |
15 |
|
Slovenia |
18 |
21 |
11 |
16 |
|
Russia |
17 |
33 |
14 |
16 |
|
Cyprus |
17 |
23 |
11 |
17 |
|
Ethiopia |
17 |
15 |
13 |
16 |
|
China |
16 |
20 |
14 |
17 |
|
Poland |
14 |
15 |
9 |
12 |
|
Italy |
13 |
16 |
8 |
12 |
|
Finland |
12 |
17 |
9 |
10 |
|
Hong Kong |
12 |
19 |
NA |
NA |
|
Ukraine |
12 |
19 |
13 |
13 |
|
Chile |
10 |
11 |
7 |
7 |
|
Burkina Faso |
10 |
12 |
10 |
12 |
|
Spain |
9 |
8 |
4 |
7 |
|
Germany |
9 |
16 |
10 |
5 |
|
Mexico |
9 |
11 |
12 |
15 |
|
Taiwan |
8 |
24 |
7 |
5 |
|
South Africa |
8 |
25 |
8 |
4 |
|
Netherlands |
8 |
10 |
11 |
3 |
|
Switzerland |
6 |
8 |
5 |
5 |
|
Peru |
6 |
6 |
5 |
8 |
|
Great Britain |
5 |
16 |
6 |
2 |
|
Australia |
5 |
6 |
9 |
3 |
|
Brazil |
5 |
8 |
9 |
7 |
|
Colombia |
5 |
NA |
NA |
10 |
|
United States |
4 |
13 |
11 |
3 |
|
New Zealand |
4 |
8 |
NA |
NA |
|
Andorra |
4 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
|
Argentina |
3 |
4 |
4 |
2 |
|
Trinidad |
3 |
5 |
6 |
2 |
|
Canada |
2 |
5 |
4 |
2 |
|
Sweden |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
Values in a Border Region – Part 2 March 17, 2009
Posted by David in Economics, Personal stuff, Politics, The Social Sciences.Tags: Border Regions, Inglehart, Oresund, World Values Survey
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The outline of my new book project is slowly taking shape. This is the latest version:
Title: Values in a Border Region: The Invisible Bridge?
Chapter 1: Border Regions of the World.
Border regions differ substantially in terms of cross-border differences, and there are several dimensions that may slow down cross-border integration processes. This chapter discusses and analyzes such differences. The chapter offers a brief introduction to the Øresund region as well as seven other comparable regions from around the world. A gravity-type regression model is used to decompose the effect of time distance from the effects of various institutional barriers such as language or legal barriers on interactions such as trade (national data), migration (national), and scientific cooperation (functional urban region data). A model is also estimated for commuting patterns within the Øresund region in order to separate time distance, land price difference, and national boundary effects (reflecting cultural differences).
Factors with potential effects on actual cross-border integration:
Geography: Time distance, natural barriers/limitation of feasible route choices (water, mountains). Øresund: short time distance between Copenhagen and Malmö – but only one route.
Language: Is the same or a similar language spoken? Is one of the languages spoken as a second language on one side, or is there a joint second language such as English? Is the majority language on one side a minority language on the other side?
Politics: Are there institutional differences that raise transaction costs associated with business ventures (e.g. different legal systems and/or business regulations). Are there barriers to trade, migration or capital flows?
Level of economic development: Are differences good or bad for integration? (Differences may reflect complementarity but may also give rise to political tensions). Note that similar levels may also allow for complementarity and, anyway, integration may in all cases cause emergent agglomeration economies. Øresund: similar levels of development on both sides; some cross-border clusters but also some clusters that are confined to one side of the sound (relative trade-off: comparative advantages versus transaction costs).
Religion: The religious affiliations of a population may reflect their informal institutions. Øresund: similar mixture of Lutheranism, agnosticism, and atheism; large Muslim minority.
In general: Values are seen as reflecting religion (starting point), economic development (evolution of values), and politics (evolution of values). Values tend to be less dependent on language and geography.
Eight case studies (ten-page introduction about Øresund; three-page introductions about each of the other seven regions)
Commuting maps should be included here. Three maps from a French article (Basel, Geneva, Luxembourg) are useful and a similar map could be constructed with the help of commuting data for the Øresund region.
Chapter 2: Values, Preferences, and Individual Behavior (What comes first – Economics or Culture?)
In this chapter individual behavior is analyzed as a rule-based activity, where the decision rules can be modeled according to psychological findings (Simon and Gigerenzer), or according to economic theories of expected utility maximization with institutional constraints.
Values tend to form early and mostly remain more or less the same for life. Preferences are much more fickle, and refer to ordinary market exchanges and consumption of relatively non-durable goods and services. Preferences tend to be altered by a variety of factors such as learning processes, momentary psychological states, and life-cycle effects.
Values form part of the institutional structure if they are shared among a group of people. When a majority or substantial subset of a population has a value in common it becomes an informal institution. When several values tend to occur in combination, we speak of a value system.
There are two main theoretical approaches to understanding the formation of values. The “thin” approach is to understand shared values as institutional side constraints. The thick approach is to investigate how institutions are formed and transmitted within a population. Values are then institutions that create both intersubjective utility-shaping structures as well as constraints on human interaction.
In economics, there are three approaches that illuminate different aspects of the role of value systems in society:
1. The intersubjective approach emphasizes realistic foundations over common neoclassical assumptions such as independent and stable individual preferences or competitive markets. Experimental psychology and models of innovation and imitation processes then become important building blocks for understanding individual value formation and group interdependencies. Psychologists such as Herbert Simon and Gerd Gigerenzer have stressed the importance of satisficing behavior, lexicographic choice and the role of intuition, while institutional-evolutionary economists from Thorstein Veblen to Geoffrey Hodgson have stressed expressive (other-directed) consumer behavior as well as the contrasts between inert, imitative, and innovative behavior. While this approach has mainly been concerned with the abstract concepts of individual choice and preference, it is but a short step to extend this approach to value systems.
2. A second approach takes orthodox neoclassical economics as a starting point, but relaxes certain key assumptions to come to grips with imperfect knowledge and positive transaction costs. Institutions are then understood as constraints on individual behavior that enable individuals to cope with uncertainty when interacting with others. This approach is closely associated with new institutional economists such as Ronald Coase, the early Douglass North, and Oliver Williamson.
3. A third approach is more concerned with macro-phenomena and the evolutionary competition among different institutional packages. Different institutions give rise to different levels of procreation, survival, and technological progress. Only those cultures that have happened to evolve “institutional packages” that enable societies to both ensure a sufficient supply of food and shelter as well as to resist the encroachments of other cultures will endure. Both military conquest and imitation of institutions that are perceived as being successful elsewhere influence the relative success and dissemination of specific cultural, economic and political institutions. Important theorists in this field include Jared Diamond, Friedrich Hayek, and Douglass North (in the later stages of their respective careers).
In the social sciences outside of economics, there are four approaches – with implications for values system analysis – that have been especially influential:
1. The Marxian approach, where values and culture is seem as a non-autonomous “superstructure” to (i.e. a reflection of) the prevailing economic organization of society.
2. The culture-first approach of Max Weber and Morishima: the cultural and religious institutions of society determine attitudes to accumulation, wealth creation, and innovation. In this scheme, it is the relative “productivity” of values with economic consequences that determine long-term economic success.
3. Inglehart’s theory of modernization and postmodernization processes. Inglehart claims that while different societies have different cultural starting points, these values are not unchanging. Instead, they co-evolve with the economic evolution of society. In other words, culture and economic development are interdependent factors.
4. The “varieties of capitalism” approach that sees distinct economic systems as a reflection of the contrasting values of different societies. While industrialized market economies are more productive than pre-industrial or centrally planned societies, different types of societies will develop slightly different institutions as a reflection of different values. Gert Hofsteede’s “cultural dimensions” are associated with this approach.
Typology of goods/services
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Publicness/Speed of change |
Fast change |
Slow change |
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Individual or household-specific |
Preference-based consumption; satisficing or constraint- based decisions |
Decisions based on perceived risk and net present value calculations. |
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Public or shared by large groups of people |
Fashions; imitation and diffusion models |
Value systems and other institutions |
Chapter 3: Value Demography and the Cohort Replacement Hypothesis.
This chapter concerns the relatively slow pace at which social value systems change. Are these changes a consequence of economic development or of other evolutionary factors? Does every new generation carry a value structure to be part of a long term substitution process, during which the values of older generations are replaced by the values of younger cohorts?
This chapter gives a brief introduction to Inglehart’s cohort replacement theory as well as a few empirical illustrations from the World Values Survey. In addition, demographic processes are discussed such as the effects of fertility and mortality rates as well as inter-cultural migration. What are the impacts of values on demographic behavior? Are the high birth rates of Muslim societies persistent during migration processes? Do women adapt to local values after migration to Scandinavia?
Chapter 4: Denmark and Sweden: An Avant-garde Region of Global Values?
In Inglehart’s studies there are ample examples of a special position in the value diagrams for Scandinavia and the Netherlands. It seems as if northern Europe has a value structure that is distinct from other postindustrial regions of the world. How and why?
Inglehart’s diagrams show Scandinavia, North America, the Netherlands, and Switzerland leading the transition toward postmodern and postmaterialist values. This is consistent with their being the most postindustrial regions of the world in terms of industrial specialization, knowledge production, and innovation propensity. There is however a marked difference regarding a second dimension associated with industrialization (the choice between “rational-legal” and “traditional” authorities) where Scandinavia (especially Sweden) is most similar to mainland China, Japan, and eastern Germany. In Inglehart’s scheme, industrialization substituted faith in Government and Science for faith in God and Family. However, this tendency was much more pronounced in northern Europe and Confucian Asia than in Catholic Europe and North America. And while the transition from industrial to post-industrial society is associated with skepticism toward all forms of authority (and a greater role for individual as compared with collective authority choice), this tendency is also less pronounced in Scandinavia in general and Sweden in particular.
An interesting hypothesis is the importance of “secular faiths” in Scandinavia and especially Sweden;
Hypothesis 1: Faith in the creation of the perfect Welfare State (1930-1980) and Faith in the creation of the perfect Environmental State (1980-)
Hypothesis 2: Faith in Family and/or God tends to be associated with non-socialists and non-environmentalists (assuming that other political ideologies are weaker/vaguer in Scandinavia).
Chapter 5: Value Change and the Political Lag
Are the political parties responsive to changing values or will the long-term evolution of values generate a “silent revolution” of politics in democracies? What are the interdependencies between value systems and political systems?
Hypothesis 1: Politics is a “lagging variable”: it changes, but it will reflect the average values of older cohorts.
Hypothesis 2: The political system influences values by providing a “default” orientation point – existing policies have an intrinsic advantage because they represent the “normal,” “no-change” situation (see psychological theories).
Chapter 6: The Emancipation of Women: Gender Differences and Gender Convergence
Earlier value studies have shown that many important choices are associated with important remaining gender differences, for example in entertainment preferences and in the choice of education and occupation, while many other values are converging.
In general, Swedes and Danes are less committed to the social preservation of gender roles (see Hofsteede’s Masculinity Index for various countries). However, there are still systematic gender differences associated with individual work and leisure choices.
Also, women tend to have more postmodern values than men, other things being equal. This has been a consistent finding, both in earlier Swedish and Danish surveys and in the World Values Survey.
This chapter provides a general description of gender differences in Denmark and Sweden, with a comparison between the 1992 and 2009 surveys. Rankings of masculine/neutral/feminine values use the following index: (p1-p2)/(p1+p2)*100, which results in an index with a range from ‑100 to +100
Chapter 7: Religious Faith, Agnosticism and Atheism: The Decline of Organized Religion in Scandinavia
Most recent value studies have shown that the populations of northern Europe in general and specifically Denmark and Sweden are increasingly secular – in contrast to North America. Is this true also of the young generation of Danes and Swedes? Will the trend toward a non-religious society continue? What are the consequences?
A relevant starting point is the institutional difference in religious structure: a marketplace of religions in North America and religious monopolies or oligopolies in Europe. Stark and Fiske have studied American religious trends and have found “product differentiation” and religious divergence to be increasingly apparent within the US, with gains for total “lifestyle packages” (e.g. Mormonism); no religion (secularization), and new religions (e.g. New Age) at the expense of low-commitment, low-service traditional churches (Episcopalians, Lutherans etc.) Catholics have partly avoided the fate of other mainstream religions by means of internal segmentation with different levels of commitment and service.
There is also the question of the welfare state crowding out the philanthropic function of churches (as well as crowding out non-religious philanthropy).
Chapter 8: Diagnosing Extremist Values
The Copenhagen-Malmo region is experiencing increasing ethnic segregation and extremist behavior in civil society and the political system. Similar tendencies have been observed in other border regions. Are extremist values retained by a portion of the young generation?
The chapter discusses and analyzes factors that may be related to intolerance of “out-groups.” The “out-groups” are also analyzed in terms of their socio-economic characteristics. One important aspect is the spatial distributions within the Øresund region. Does intolerance tend to be directed at all groups, or are there “clusters” of intolerance that are associated with various background variables? (For example: general intolerance, drug intolerance, religious intolerance, sexual intolerance etc.)
In this chapter, an intolerance index will be applied: (12 – number of groups not liked)/12*100. This index ranges from 100 – every group accepted – to 0 – no group accepted. Comparisons are made between genders, educational programs, socio-economic backgrounds, municipalities, immigration background, and countries (S/DK). Comparisons regarding specific out-groups are also carried out.
A logit equation should be estimated to explain the importance of different variables in determining (and predicting) the probability of out-group intolerance.
Chapter 9: Education and Work: The Changing Money-Happiness Trade-off
The older generations in industrial society tended to prefer monetary returns in terms of wages and salaries to jobs promising creativity, communication and self-control. Recent value studies have indicated that the choice of education and work increasingly favor creative and interesting jobs at the expense of monetary returns.
It should also be noted that monetary returns to educational investments in Denmark and Sweden are among the lowest in the western world. Do low monetary incentives matter less when other job attributes are deemed to be more important?
Chapter 10: Should I Go or Should I Stay: The Urban-Rural and the National-Global Trade-offs
Nothing seems to be as dominant as the migration to highly urbanized areas. This would favor conurbations like the Copenhagen-Malmö region with its population of almost three million. Another emerging tendency is a desire to combine an urban job with a semi-rural residential location. Is this desire different when viewed from a short-term and a long-term perspective? Most value systems studies have also shown an increasing tendency to look upon the leading global metropolitan regions as a network of accessible labor markets. Will global differences in economic returns lead to a “brain drain” from the Øresund region to more remunerative positions in global metropolises such as London or New York.
Chapter 11: Housing Preferences and the Future of Land-use Planning
Swedes and Danes spend a large share of their income on housing. This is especially true of the largest metropolitan regions. There is also a general tendency for housing to be income-elastic. But the choice of housing involves a number of unavoidable trade-offs, particularly concerning housing attributes such as lot size, floor area, workplace accessibility, leisure accessibility, and socio-economic neighborhood character. What do young people prioritize? Do they give priority to the same factors regardless of time horizon? Has environmental concerns given rise to new housing preferences?
The preferred type of housing has profound implications for the economic viability of alternative land-use plans. Both property developers and municipalities may therefore benefit from being well-informed about the desires of the young.
Chapter 12: Homo Ludens and the Importance of Being Entertained
One of the most rapidly growing sectors of postmodern society is the sector generating experiences, entertainment and the arts. The young generation of today have more generous income and time constraints in their pursuit of satisfying leisure activities. The entertainment sector is therefore one of the most income-elastic. What are the leisure pursuits of the future? What are the trade-offs?
Chapter 13: The New Nature Worshippers: Health, Environment, and Sustainability
One of the most visible changes in recent years has been the increasing priority given to quality-of-life attributes such as health, environmental quality, and ecological sustainability. This is apparent from politics, the mass media, marketing, and popular entertainment. What does this imply about the political and economic life of the future? What does it imply about housing, leisure, and lifestyle choices? And what are the differences between different parts of the region and different socio-economic and ethnic groups?
Chapter 14: Cross-sound Interaction Before and After the Bridge
This chapter compares how the bridge has affected actual behaviour patterns and attitudes by comparing the responses from 1992 with 2009. Is Øresund substantially more integrated today than 15 or 20 years ago?
Chapter 15: Øresund Values: Long-run Convergence or Stable Contrasts?
Summary and conclusions
Appendix: Statistical Methods and Data
New Values Survey February 26, 2009
Posted by David in Personal stuff, The Social Sciences.Tags: Border Regions, Oresund, World Values Survey
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A research project that I’m participating in this and next year includes a new questionnaire survey of high school seniors (aged 18 to 19) in the Oresund region, which consists of the Copenhagen metropolitan area (Hovedstadsregionen) in Denmark and the Swedish Scania (Skåne) region. We have enlisted the help of several dozen high schools on both sides of the Sound, where questionnaires are being distributed by teachers in social science classes. The project is primarily supported by organizations on the Swedish side, such as Region Skåne and the Southern Swedish Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
The project has two objectives. The first objective is to compare the new results with the results of an earlier analogous survey that was carried out in 1991, especially regarding the integration of the two sides that may have taken place as an effect of the new Oresund road-and-rail bridge. The bridge connects the two sides and makes daily commuting between Zealand and Scania feasible for the first time. The second objective is to put the respondents’ values in a wider context by adding a few key questions from the World Values Survey (WVS) to the questionnaire. We have included all three questions that make up the “postmaterialism index” as well as a number of questions dealing with tolerance and territorial loyalties.
The project should eventually yield an academic book (with me as one of the co-authors). The book is to be published for an international readership in English. We are also planning for a major conference after the publication of the book as well as a number of popular publications in Danish and Swedish. The conference is scheduled for the summer of 2011 (the dates and venues have not been decided yet).
So far, we have received more than 200 completed questionnaires from three Swedish municipalities. The first results have been partly according to expectations and partly surprising. I don’t want to say very much about these very partial results, but gender differences are as strinking as they always tend to be in this context: a much greater proportion of young men than young women are intolerant of deviations from cultural, behavioral or ethnic norms.