Posted by David in Economics, Politics.
Tags: Hayek, Keynes
Last year I discovered hip-hop as an enjoyable genre, with Fear the Boom and Bust. A sequel is now available, at
http://econstories.tv/2011/04/28/fight-of-the-century-music-video/
The Fight of the Century features the following refrain:
Which way should we choose?
more bottom up or more top down
… the fight continues …
it’s time to weigh in
more from the top or from the ground
…let’s listen to the greats
Keynes and Hayek throwing down
And this is my favorite part:
Creating employment is a straightforward craft. When the nation’s at war, and there’s a draft. If every worker was staffed in the army and fleet. We’d have full employment and nothing to eat.
HT: James Taylor
Posted by David in The Social Sciences.
Tags: Hayek, Polanyi, Studies in Emergent Order, Virgil Storr
Studies in Emergent Order is an interdisciplinary journal that was founded in late 2008 and that I support, both as a contributor of two papers (so far) and as a member of the editorial board. I support it both because of its interesting subject matter, and because it’s an open-access journal.
The aim of the journal is to advance the analysis of spontaneous or emergent orders. The most frequently analyzed spontaneous order is the market order, but recent contributions have considered the legal system, democracy, science, the arts, and religion. The pioneers in emergent-order theorizing include Friedrich Hayek and Michael Polanyi, who were mostly concerned with markets (Hayek) and science (Polanyi). I encourage colleagues and students to submit articles. Such articles will be reviewed by at least two anonymous referees and the new editor of the journal (Virgil Storr, an economics professor at George Mason University).
This is the call for papers:
Studies in Emergent Order (SIEO) is announcing a general call for papers for its upcoming issues. Studies in Emergent Order (http://www.studiesinemergentorder.org) is a refereed, open-access journal dedicated to fostering research, discussion and publication concerning the roles played by and implications of emergent order phenomena, particularly in society but not excluding other areas.
Manuscripts should be sent as Microsoft Word attachments via email to submissions@sieo.org. Manuscripts submitted to this journal should not have been published elsewhere and should not simultaneously be submitted to another journal. Papers should be between 8,000 and 11,000 words in length. For more information on submission guidelines please visit http://studiesinemergentorder.org/submissions/.
Please do not hesitate to contact the editor with any questions about SIEO. Inquiries should be directed to:
Dr. Virgil Henry Storr (vstorr@gmu.edu)
Editor-in-Chief, Studies in Emergent Order
3301 N Fairfax Drive, Suite 450, Arlington, VA 22201
(703) 993-8127
Posted by David in Economics, Politics.
Tags: Hayek, Theodore Burczak
The final version of my review essay is now available: http://journals.cambridge.org/repo_A78R8XbY
Reference: Andersson, David Emanuel. (forthcoming 2010). “Liberalism after Burczak: Redistribution, Worker Self-management and the Market Process,” Journal of Institutional Economics.
The paper constitutes my attempt to discuss Burczak’s market socialist proposals from what I think is my moderate classical liberal perspective. Burczak’s book looks like this:

Burczak’s book is highly recommended for socialists and non-socialists alike, particularly for socialists who have not (yet) grasped the desirability of decentralized market entrepreneurship.
Posted by David in Economics, Politics, Reflections.
Tags: Constitution of Liberty, Hayek

Over the past two weeks, I have been reading the Constitution of Liberty at a much slower pace than the first time I was reading it about 15 or 16 years ago. I was surprised to discover that I actually like it better than the first time around. Why could that be?
I think there are two reasons, of which one is emotional and the other an effect of my personal learning process. To put it bluntly, I was full of resentment against government action in the early 1990s. The fact that I was forced to waste more than half a year just because the government would imprison me otherwise made me detest the lack of respect of what I perceived as my individual rights. Before Hayek, I had read Anarchy, State, and Utopia by Nozick, which was much more inspiring, given my state of mind. The opening sentence of that book, “Individuals have rights,” as well as the consistent rejection of all government activity beyond the minimal state were the most inspiring words I had ever read. After Nozick, I felt that Hayek conceded almost everything that modern states do, apart from downright stupidity such as protectionism or rent ceilings. More importantly, he explicitly stated that a limited period of national service is compatible with a free society. After reading that, I basically skimmed through the rest.
I have now changed my mind, even though I still think that national service is something that constitutes an unambiguous violation of those rights that should be protected by any society that wants to consider itself liberal in the individualist sense of the word. The problem with Nozick is that he was preaching to the choir. What about those people who do not believe that individuals should have exhaustively defined rights?
For those without strong individualist values, Hayek is better than Nozick. It is not necessary to believe that individual freedom is the ultimate value. It is enough to understand that protected individual property rights are necessary not only for material prosperity but also for the growth of knowledge, which seems to be the underlying foundational value that Hayek really cared about. This becomes especially clear toward the end of the book, where Hayek writes that “the ultimate aim of freedom is the enlargement of those capacities in which man surpasses his ancestors and to which each generation must endeavor to add its share – its share in the growth of knowledge and the gradual advance of moral and aesthetic beliefs, where no superior must be allowed to enforce one set of views of what is right or good and where only further experience can decide what should prevail” (p. 394).
The other difference from last time is that I know more economics now. In the early 1990s, I knew next to nothing about Austrian economics and even less about institutional economics. In the Constitution of Liberty, I can now perceive that all the arguments are based on a solid economic foundation and combine the insights of the Austrian and new institutional perspectives. But one has to be able to read between the lines most of the time. Over the past 15 years, I have read a lot of books and papers that evidently makes me now see what I couldn’t see earlier. Particularly important for an understanding of Hayek’s conclusions are basic Austrian economics such as Menger’s Principles of Economics and Mises’s Human Action as well as Hayek’s own contributions on dispersed knowledge. I think it is the case that if you have absorbed such works you can understand better why for example a flat tax is less destructive than a progressive tax or why indeed national service is less subversive of the market economy than the administered prices implicit in misguided policies such as rent control or a minimum wage.
Ultimately, however, I think that political decentralization coupled with free flows of labor, capital, goods, and services is the only viable method of preventing an ever more intrusive government. A constitution seems to be of little use, unless most people actually care about as well as understand the prerequisites of well-functioning markets. The US Constitution is an impressive document, but it has not prevented Congress from usurping ever-greater economic powers.
Hayek does note the importance of political decentralization, but unfortunately he does not spend as much time on elaborating its mechanisms as he does on which types of state discretion ought to be banned for the benefit of almost all. On page 263, Hayek writes:
Hardly less important than the problems of international relations is that of centralization versus decentralization of government. In spite of its traditional connection with most of the problems we shall be discussing, we shall not be able to consider it systematically. While it has always been characteristic of those favoring an increase in governmental powers to support maximum concentration of these powers, those mainly concerned with individual liberty have generally advocated decentralization. There are strong reasons why action by local authorities generally offers the next-best solution where private initiative cannot be relied upon to provide certain services and where some sort of collective action is therefore needed; for it has many of the advantages of private enterprise and fewer of the dangers of the coercive action of government. Competition between local authorities or between larger units within an area where there is freedom of movement provides in a large measure that opportunity for experimentation with alternative methods which will secure most of the advantages of free growth. Though the majority of individuals may never contemplate a change of residence, there will usually be enough people, especially among the young and enterprising, to make it necessary for the local authorities to provide as good services at as reasonable costs as their competitors. It is usually the authoritarian planner who, in the interest of uniformity, governmental efficiency, and administrative convenience, supports the centralist tendencies and in this receives the strong support of the poorer majorities, who wish to be able to tap the resources of the wealthier regions.
Fortunately, the proportion of people who are willing to move from their “home community” has empirically tended to increase as economies become more knowledge-oriented. I think the topic of political decentralization is one of the most promising areas of research both in economics and in political philosophy. It also offers an agenda for moderate classical liberals of the Hayekian type: advocate political decentralization consistently and frequently; always resist “harmonization” and supra-national or large-area coercion; and promote the free flow of people, capital, goods, and services!
Posted by David in Economics, Politics.
Tags: Hayek, Keynes, Rap

An NSYSU MBA student, Andrea Cejkova, talked about the Constitution of Liberty yesterday. She ended her presentation by showing a truly awesome rap video on the contrast between Hayek and Keynes. Yes, that’s right, a rap video on economic theory! Apparently, this video has become a big hit on college campuses around the world, with more than a million downloads.
Here it is:
Fear the Boom and Bust
Posted by David in Reflections.
Tags: Hayek, S. Hayek

“The mind cannot foresee its own advance.” F.A. Hayek

“I keep waiting to meet a man who has more balls than I do.” S. Hayek
Who wins?
Posted by David in Economics, Personal stuff, Politics, Reflections, The Social Sciences.
Tags: Adam Smith, Carl Menger, Geoffrey Hodgson, Hayek, Helmut Schmidt, Jane Jacobs, Margaret Thatcher, Mises, Sandy Ikeda, Theodore Burczak
David: Why did you choose Hayek and Jacobs as your favorite thinkers?
DAVID: I chose Hayek and Jacobs because they’re the only thinkers who have transformed the way I think about whatever social phenomena I’m interested in. Jacobs’s “The Death and Life of Great American Cities” suddenly made sense of things of which I had been vaguely aware but which I could not articulate. I had been struggling with urban economic theory, but found the abstract models difficult to reconcile with observed reality. To this day, it remains my favorite book. This was while I was pursuing my PhD in regional planning around 1995. The first book I read that was allegedly by Hayek was the Fatal Conceit, which I liked but which was not one of my favorite books. That must have been around 1991 or 1992. Then at about the same time that I was reading Death and Life I came across Hayek’s paper entitled “The Use of Knowledge in Society” which made sense of why I couldn’t make sense of standard equilibrium models in economics. The interesting thing is that the Jacobs book and the Hayek paper tell essentially the same story. One could almost say that Hayek’s 1945 paper is a generalized and more abstract summary of the central arguments in Jacobs’s book. To this day, I consider Hayek’s paper the best short article ever written in economics. So I would say that Hayek’s 1945 paper and Jacobs’s 1961 book changed my approach to economics, urban planning, and politics for good.
David: Could you summarize in one sentence the intellectual transformation that Hayek and Jacobs caused in your own thinking?
DAVID: I went from a world where information and knowledge were disregarded into a world where knowedge is subjective, imperfect, and local.
David: Were there any political implications of your theoretical shift?
DAVID: Yes, I would say that it would be very difficult indeed to keep conventional political views while being converted to a Hayekian-Jacobsian understanding of the human world. We have to remember that Hayek was the guy who showed that central planning is associated with massive knowledge losses as compared with markets while Jacobs showed how centralized city planning disregards the valuable local knowledge of residents in specific neighborhoods. So all kinds of top-down policies and plans become suspect and inherently unattractive. So while I have had liberal, democratic, and individualist values since when I was about 19 or 20 years old, my interpretation of the desirability of various specific policies have changed. To give you an example, the middle-of-the-road (Swedish) Liberal Party recently proposed that schools should be the responsibility of the national government rather than municipalities in order to ensure higher academic standards. Before 1995 I might have said that this seems like a worthwhile policy, but today I’m resolutely against it. The education system needs decentralized local experimentation in the same way that shoe stores, restaurants, and health care need decentralized local experimentation. So it’s not just a matter of being in favor of markets, democracy, and science. It’s a matter of being in favor of entrepreneurial markets, bottom-up democracy, and science with competing research programs.
David: Both Hayek and Jacobs have been criticized for lacking a consistent ideology, even though each has influenced a number of ideologues, politicians, and movements (and not necessarily the same people). What are your thoughts about this?
DAVID: Let’s look at Hayek first. He started out as a moderate left-winger until he came under the influence of Ludwig von Mises, who is of course known as a consistent defender of classical liberal institutions and a very small state. The followers of Mises (so-called “Misesian Austrians”) are as far as I know nowadays without exception minarchist or even anarchist libertarians. Hayek was much more moderate in the degree of government activity that he considered possible to combine with a well-functioning market economy, although his specific policy proposals tended to shift over time. In the Consititution of Liberty, for example, he states that he has no problems with government provision of education as long as private producers are allowed to compete with the public sector. He also accepts a safety net such as a minimum income as well as municipal zoning policies. On the other hand, in the 1970s he advocated the denationalization of money. Then in the Fatal Conceit he comes across as a pro-market conservative, but I don’t think we should put too much faith in that book. According to reliable sources, that book was mainly written by his “editor” (Bartley) when Hayek was almost 90 and not in very good health. What I think is consistent in Hayek is not any specific policy proposal, but rather a sort of open-minded and open-ended liberal consequentialism that makes it possible to reassess policies when new information becomes available. It is also interesting that Hayek has had a much wider sphere of influence than Mises. Thatcher famously said that “this is what we believe in” while referring to the Constitution of Liberty. On the other hand, the moderate German Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt called himself a “Hayekian.” And two left-wing economists, Geoffrey Hodgson and Ted Burczak have recently either proposed (Burczak) or envisioned (Hodgson) post-capitalist economies with worker-controlled firms while acknowledging that Hayek won the Socialist Calculation Debate in the 1930s. What all these people have in common is that the Hayekian influence has made them more pro-market than others with similar values. Margaret Thatcher was more sensible than Richard Nixon; Helmut Schmidt was more economically literate than Michael Foot; and Ted Burczak ‘s socialism makes more sense than Oskar Lange’s.
David: And Jacobs?
DAVID: Jacobs had a great deal of influence on the “New Urbanism” movement, who understood the need for mixed uses but neglected the need for market feedback (unlike Jacobs herself). But then the New Urbanists are architects, and in my experience architects are especially hopeless when it comes to understanding the value of decentralized markets. Maybe that’s why so many of them like working for Arab sheiks and Chinese bureaucrats. She has also had some influence on the green movement, which tend to be strong on democracy and human rights (which I like) but weak on markets (which makes them impossible to vote for in my view). Fortunately, there are a few Hayekian economists who have discovered Jacobs and are attempting a much needed synthesis. Sandy Ikeda is probably the most obvious example of a Hayek-Jacobs economist, but there are others. So I guess that one can say that Jacobs has influenced an uncommon variety of people with very different ideologies, including greens, libertarians, and confused technocrats. But if you look at her various specific proposals they are actually quite similar to Hayek’s: open-ended and open-minded liberal consequentialism that in her case focused on local entrepreneurship, decentralized democracy and trial-and-error experimentation.
David: Are there any specific policy proposals by Hayek or Jacobs with which you disagree?
DAVID: Sure. I think Hayek was superficial and plain wrong when he gave his stamp of approval to conventional zoning regulations. Jacobs is much better on zoning. On the other hand, Jacobs’s hostility to cars and suburbs is too categorical. Now I happen to share her dislike of cars (I like to walk) and monotonous suburbs, but I think the fact remains that a large proportion of people actually like their cars and McMansions. I think we have to respect that, even if bustling and diverse downtowns are better for creativity and innovative start-ups. There are many other examples where I disagree with specific policies even though I agree with the big picture.
David: Speaking of creativity, do you think that Hayek and Jacobs were more creative than other 20th century social theorists?
DAVID: Indeed I do. I think Hayek to some extent and Jacobs to an even greater extent illustrate that while competence and creativity are great complements, these two by-and-large desirable characteristics are sometimes unfortunately substitutes. Consider the average guy defending his or her dissertation. For the most part, PhDs are competent in their chosen discipline but not terribly creative. They tend to specialize in a very narrow field and then spend a lifetime publishing a “theme with empirical variations,” say cost-benefit analyses of sugar mills. Now if you look at Hayek, in the first part of his career he undoubtedly emphasized competence over creativity. Hayek studied the Austrian variant of what was then the neoclassical mainstream, first under Wieser and then under Mises. What resulted was the most generally respectable part of his published output (let’s call it Hayek I). He extended a monetary theory of the business cycle and investigated the indirect effects of regulated rents in the housing market and so forth. It was all very competent and perhaps incrementally creative but not terribly exciting. It was only with his emphasis on subjective and dispersed knowledge (Hayek II) during the Socalist Calculation Debate that he created a totally new approach. I think it’s telling that this was also the start of his relative decline in his professional reputation among economists. And then he wrote a path-breaking book on theoretical psychology. And eventually he became Hayek III, with a focus on a mixture of economics, political philosophy, and cultural evolution. I think it’s noteworthy that Hayek himself said that he did not have the ability to construct the grand theoretical edifices for which Mises became famous; he said that he was instead experimenting and exploring at the margin. So Mises was probably more competent, but Hayek was more creative, I think that there can be no doubt about that. But more importantly, Hayek’s undogmatic open-endedness created a foundation for other social scientists to use as a strating point. “Misesian” economics, by contrast, has become a theoretical cul-de-sac where the members are repeating themselves. It is not a progressive research program, and I know of no eclectic Misesian fellow travelers. There are however plenty of Hayekian fellow travelers who are not usually considered Austrian economists — for example Douglass North, Vernon Smith, Oliver Williamson and so forth.
Jacobs is an even more clear-cut case. She never got a college degree, choosing instead to spend two years auditing a very diverse set of courses at Columbia University. So her competence was sketchy. But in her case that was a good thing, given the extremely unhelpful theoretical constructs used in urban planning. Maybe she could have used some more theoretical competence – her discussion of economic theories in some of her books sometimes betrays a lack of depth - but on the other hand it enabled her to offer a totally new approach to urban planning and urban economics which was based on observed reality rather than Platonic utopias. It is difficult to imagine any of her books had she gotten a PhD in urban planning or economics. They would probably then have been totally forgotten dry academic treatises that applied the theories favored by her advisor.
I like to use an analogy from jazz, which also benefits from creativity among its practitioners. Friedrich Hayek is like Keith Jarrett – a classically trained pianist who switched to free-form solo improvisations and eclectic modern jazz – first with two quartets and later with his own trio. Nevertheless, he managed to record pieces such as the Goldberg Variations and the Well-tempered Clavier (by Bach) as well as modern pieces by Shostakovich. Jane Jacobs is more like Miles Davis – the enormously creative jazz trumpeter who created three new genres (cool, modal jazz, and fusion) but who would never be able to play a classical concerto with the required competence. Most social science professors, however, are like Wynton Marsalis – a jazz and classical trumpeter with a very high level of competence (“virtuosity”) but with no style to call his own.
David: How come you have not listed any of the thinkers who had a decisive influence on Hayek among your favorite thinkers? I’m thinking of people like Adam Smith, David Hume, Carl Menger, and Ludwig von Mises.
DAVID: Now, Smith, Hume, and Menger are clearly at least as creative as Hayek. Smith created economics as a discipline, Hume a school of philosophy, and Menger created the distinctive Austrian schoold by generalizing his real-world observations while working as a financial journalist for the Wiener Zeitung (Menger was in this similar to Jacobs). Mises filled in the gaps in Menger’s system, although unfortunately he tried (and thought he succeeded) to bring closure to economics as a discipline. I think Mises’s Human Action is the best textbook there is in economics, but please skip the first 100 pages, where he more or less delimits economics as equal to Human Action (Mises was only interested in those economic laws that are universally true – in other words if it’s not true of all rational economic actors it’s not economics, which makes interesting empirical economic problems something else than economics). Now Menger is very open-ended; unfortunately his work is also very incomplete although with a number of insights that were revolutionary at the time. Smith is still interesting and mostly correct, but some parts are downright wrong such as his view of economic value. The good thing about Hayek is that he integrates all the really valuable parts in Smith, Menger, and Mises into his theoretical framework, while not keeping the questionable parts. So Hayek is indispensable in my view, whereas Smith, Menger, and Mises are good and interesting but not truly required reading any longer.
David: Are there any undeservedly neglected parts in Hayek’s and/or Jacobs’s work:
DAVID: In Hayek, I think that most of the really important stuff is being reused and expanded by at least a few economists. However, Hayek’s idea of spontaneous orders has rarely been applied to other fields than markets or perhaps the legal system. Fortunately, the Foundation for the Study of Spontaneous Orders has been sponsoring a new journal and a few conferences where contributors are encouraged to apply spontaneous order theory to new domains (I have been involved in this). Regarding Jacobs I think her excellent little book entitled “Systems of Survival” offers up a new approach to informal institutions with her description of two patterns of moral behavior — Moral Syndrome A and Moral Syndrome B. Moral Syndrome A gives priority to values such as honesty, workmanship, and openness whereas Moral Syndrome B favors honor, duty, loyalty and so on. Jacobs hypothesizes that Moral Syndrome A is more common among businesspeople, scientists, and traders whereas Moral Syndrome B dominates politics, the military, religious hierarchies and so on. I can think of interesting empirical applications for studying cross-cultural and international conflicts on the basis of this dichotomy, but so far I don’t think that anyone has attempted this.
David: To what extent have Hayek and/or Jacobs penetrated your own work.
DAVID: Everything I write on economics is built on a Hayekian foundation. And everything I write about problems with a spatial dimension has a Jacobsian foundation. This does not mean that I always refer to them, but it’s the default position for me. On the other hand, I don’t slavishly follow everything Hayek or Jacobs claim. I stick to their core assumptions, but not necessarily to their more detailed analyses. I do however not accept Hayek’s methodological individualism, even though I share his normative individualism. Hayek almost rejected methodological individualism himself in a footnote to Law, Legislation, and Liberty, but ultimately I think we have a rare instance – in Hayek’s case – of too much competence (read: too much Mises) and not enough creativity.
David: Is there anything outside of their theoretical contributions which you find particularly inspiring?
DAVID: Yes, I find Hayek’s insistence that the state should have no goals of its own very inspiring. What he was saying was that the state is ok if it is like the municipal provision of a power grid or street-cleaning but it has exceeded it’s authority if there are any national goals or ideas about a shared collective purpose. These are ultimately very liberal sentiments in the European sense of the word, but then again I’m a European liberal. The most inspiring part of Jacobs’s message is her belief in cities rather than nations as the basic unit of political organizations, and further that governance within cities should itself be decentralized to neighborhoods. I also find their anti-nationalism inspiring. Hayek became a British citizen and claimed that it’s possible and perhaps common to feel more at home in a culture other than the one into which one is born (he expressed a preference for British over Austrian culture). Jacobs emigrated from the US to Canada because she preferred it there and because of opposition to the Vietnam War. Particularly in the Jacobs case, there is therefore also a strong dose of anti-militarism that I share.
David: Any hopes for the future?
DAVID: Yes, I hope that the combination of ideas from Hayek and Jacobs will become the future mainstream in urban economics and urban planning.
David: Thank you for taking time to answer these questions!
DAVID: My pleasure.
Posted by David in Reflections, The Social Sciences.
Tags: Hayek, Jane Jacobs
Friedrich August Hayek (May 8, 1899 [Vienna] - March 23, 1992 [Freiburg]) 
Jane Jacobs (May 4, 1916 [Scranton, PA] – April 25, 2006 [Toronto, ON])

I have come to the conclusion that it’s impossible to say who I regard as the most persuasive thinker in the social sciences; Friedrich Hayek and Jane Jacobs have both been equally important in influencing my weltanschauung. Since Hayek and Jacobs are much better known that the other eight thinkers on my list (with the possible exception of Schumpeter), I will not summarize their respective contributions. Instead, the next post will feature a conversation: “David interviews DAVID about his relationship to the ideas of Hayek and Jacobs.”
Posted by David in Economics, Personal stuff, The Social Sciences.
Tags: Brian Loasby, GLS Shackle, Hayek, Ludwig Lachmann, Max Weber, Murray Rothbard, Peter Lewin, Roger Koppl
In my view, Ludwig Lachmann is the most underappreciated 20th century thinker. Perhaps for that reason, I’m adamant in my commitment to include some of Lachmann’s theories and ideas in all of the courses that I teach. I have also tried to build on his work in my two books, particularly in Property Rights, Consumption, and the Market Process from 2008.
While Lachmann belonged to the Austrian tradition in economics, he was without doubt its most unusual member. In part, this was a result of his educational background. From Berlin rather than Vienna, he first studied with Werner Sombart, before his encounter with Hayek at LSE in the 1930s. While not especially fond of Keynesian policies, he was nevertheless influenced by Keynes’s focus on expectations, and developed an approach to economics that was actually quite similar to that of George Shackle.
In the 1870s, the marginal revolution in economics owed much to the recognition that consumer preferences are subjective and the source of all economic valuations. Hayek’s great contribution was to extend the subjectivist framework to knowledge; information is not equally available to all market participants and the interpretation of this partial information is in itself subjective. Frank Knight and John Maynard Keynes stressed the structural uncertainty of the future, which rested on the insight that expectations of the future could not be assumed to be objectively true, since this would require knowledge of the future state of knowledge, which is a logical impossibility. Thus, expectations are also subjective. Lachmann, more than anyone else, stressed the threefold nature of subjectivity. Preferences are subjective, but so is knowledge and so are expectations.
Taking expectations seriously has enormous implications for our understanding of capital markets. The earlier conception of a homogeneous capital stock becomes untenable. Equilibrium and equilibration can no longer be assumed. Instead we are left with a capital structure that is in a state of permanent flux, as the different expectations of experimental entrepreneurs cause changes to the uses of various capital goods and changing market valuations that may or may not lead to greater coordination over time. However, in the Lachmannian framework market coordination is not automatically desirable. Economic development leads to increasing complexity, and the more rapid this development, the less likely it is that we will see stable equilibrium prices for various production factors.
This does however not mean that there is never any coordination in dynamic economies. For goods and services with a short time horizon, there may very well be market coordination along the lines that was described by Hayek in “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” Consequently, expectations become less important in markets for the short-term rental of services and the transfer of perishable goods. Still, the focus on equilibria, “circular flows,” and “evenly revolving economies” inevitably becomes less central if one adopts a radical subjectivist framework.
Lachmann realized that there were also stabilizing features in society. These stabilizing features are institutions, which implies that to the extent that relatively durable equilibria do in fact exist they will have to be explained by the role of institutions in making expectations converge. The influence of Max Weber was very much in evidence when Lachmann discussed such institutions. He even wrote a book called “The Legacy of Max Weber.” In that book, he uses the German political system as a case study of how institutions sometimes stabilize expectations, while sometimes they do not. In the post-war German political system, there has been a general expectation among all the major political parties that democracy is here to stay; there is thus an institutional equilibrium in the political sphere. The Weimar Republic was also a parliamentary democracy, but in that case there was no shared expectation or even shared desire for democracy to endure; it was at most regarded as a transitional compromise prior to achieving a socialist, nationalist or national socialist revolution.
It is this emphasis on institutions that sets Lachmann apart from Shackle, who otherwise shares a similar open-ended view of the economy. While Shackle claimed that there is no such thing as good policy advice (we know too little), Lachmann was more optimistic, being generally supportive of the market economy, entrepreneurship, and non-inflationary monetary policies. But it is still fair to conclude that Lachmann was never an ideological firebrand; he was more interested in economic theory than in the organization of society.
Perhaps this is the reason for Lachmann’s relative obscurity. It is simply not as easy to attract followers when the goal is theoretical rather than political reform. In this sense, Lachmann was the “anti-Rothbard” of Austrian economics (Rothbard had few original economic contributions, and instead developed an extreme version of libertarianism that would seek to abolish the state in its entirety). But it is my conviction that Lachmann will be read by more people in 100 years than read him now, whereas Rothbard will by that time be no more than a footnote in the history of political ideas.
There are already encouraging signs that Lachmann’s theories are being taken more seriously. Peter Lewin has produced a historical account of the development of capital theory which presents Lachmann more or less as the guy who corrected the flaws in Bohm-Bawerk and Hayek. With his Big Players theory, Roger Koppl has attempted to look at the interplay between expectations and institutions within the framework of long-term economic development. Other economists who have extended Lachmannian ideas include Mario Rizzo, Don Lavoie, Brian Loasby, Nicolai Foss, Paul Lewis, and Jochen Runde.
Posted by David in Economics, Politics, The Social Sciences.
Tags: Hayek, Rodney Stark, Roger Finke
I visited New York in 2001, about three months before 9/11. I was staying at a place near Columbia University, and on my last day there I decided to take a short walk and check out Columbia’s bookstore. I’m not someone who enjoys shopping, but bookstores are an exception. I spent several hours there, and – as usual – picked up 6 or 7 almost random books that attracted me in some way or other (the subject, the design, the price or whatever).
One of the books I bought was “Acts of Faith: Exploring the Human Side of Religion,” by Rodney Stark and Roger Finke (2000). An unusual choice, in that I’m neither a sociologist nor a social scientist with a special interest in religion. I tend to be skeptical when I start reading books by sociologists, since they tend to share certain assumptions that I consider extremely unappealing as well as being unhelpful for understanding the world. Examples include that they often assume that people have no or almost no choice, that class and race and gender are all more important than individuality, and an understanding of the economy that makes me wonder whether sociology is a synonym for socialism.
Acts of Faith did not conform to any of these stereotypes. Conversely, Rodney Stark and his co-author seemed to have a deeper understanding of economics than many economists. The run-of-the-mill economist starts out with an assumption like this: “Restricted by available options, guided by their preferences, humans make rational choices.” Stark’s Proposition I (their fundamental assumption) is instead this: “Within the limits of their information and understanding, restricted by available options, guided by their preferences and tastes, humans attempt to make rational choices.” In other words, Stark is someone who not only understands conventional economics, but integrates notions of bounded rationality and the subjectivity of knowledge.
He also understands the free-riding problem, which is evident not only in this book but in all of the journal papers by him that I have read. And unlike virtually all sociologists and most economists, he does not think that governments are necessary to solve free-riding problems. Invoking Adam Smith, he notes that state-imposed religion is not only coercive; it also gives rise to lazy producers (priests etc.), less innovation, and a reduced ability to meet latent consumer preferences. Indeed, he argues that the main reason that Americans tend to be more religious than Europeans is that American religion has been separated from the state since the 18th century and that this has created a market with innovative religious entrepreneurs, who experiment with both product innovation and pricing (in the form of a variety of selective exclusion mechanisms) to produce a more rewarding religious experience. Stark notes that religious consumers are also co-producers of a joint experience good, or what I would call a “territorial public good.”
Another thing that I like about Stark is his methodological approach. He states assumptions and hypotheses clearly, using clear and unambiguous language rather than intricate formulas or unintelligible sociological terms. He then goes on to test his carefully derived hypotheses (which use persuasive rather than mathematically convenient assumptions) by means of a variety of empirical methods in a wide variety of spatiotemporal contexts. He uses standard statistical techniques as well as historical investigations of special cases. In the latter case, he has become famous for a sort of network theory of conversion, arguing that religions recruit new adherents through networks of relatives and close friends, and that mass conversions rarely if ever happen. The network theory is based on historical investigations of high-growth churches, such as 19th century Mormonism or 20th century Moonies.
What I have found especially valuable in Stark’s output is that it offers a lot of ideas for analogies and cross-fertilization. In a paper that was published yesterday, I argue that Stark’s “religious economy theory” is perfect as a starting point for Hayekian spontaneous-order theorizing in the domain of religious life (link: http://www.studiesinemergentorder.org/PDF/SIEO%20Vol%203%20(2010)%20Andersson.pdf ) . I even refer to Stark’s work in my latest (still unpublished) paper on planning in creative cities. In this newer paper, I note the analogies between religious organizations, the supply of territorial public goods in urban settings, and the education system.